What Is the Definition of Inconsistencies in Science
Vision, in fact, has shifted from philosophy to science. But perception is not. Seeing is necessary for (a form of) perception, but it is not enough (animals see things, it is not clear that they perceive things (i.e. bring them under concepts). This chapter presents a model theoretical presentation in which accounting for theories as partial structures offers a simple and natural way to account for inconsistencies. In particular, the heuristic significance of inconsistencies in science is emphasized. From the epistemic perspective, inconsistent theories can then be considered quasi-true and accepted as such, like any other scientific theory. This common epistemic framework forces us to blur the standard distinction between discovery and justification. A form of paracoherent logic is introduced at the epistemic level as a quasi-truth logic. Logic is not necessary to human life (even the concept of inconsistency, taken in a strict scientific sense, is not necessary, of course, it is noticed in a broad sense in ordinary language), and the use is, historically, as modified, from Greece by a theory of the foreign and culturally rare or even unique concept of essence (being, ousia) as the basis of the concept of identity (for example, in ancient Hebrew, there is no word for is in Arabic, and the Romans found Greek logic strange). The standard of consistency as a guardian of truth is unnecessary (i.e., it is either a convention or an unnecessary rarity of cultural beliefs).
It might never have been developed, and therefore its specific way of seeking would not have come, there is no need to seek the truth. This means that the only standard in such cases may be what gives the results people want. Coherence is simply a matter of expediency in a particular area of work; It is a merit to be judged ad hoc and according to the desired results by practitioners. We do not use intuitionistic or paraconsistent logic in everyday life. These are only used by mathematicians. I do not understand what that might mean. And I do not make it a pedantic, but a simple and literal question. Hegel, for example, also does not use intuitionistic logic, although everyone seems to complain that he does, certainly not in a practical sense (whatever else happens in extreme and perhaps imaginary speculative theory). In life, we only notice in one way or another when people are grossly inconsistent or consistent. None of these inconsistencies are also a worrisome inconsistency, Vickers says. Nor is it a dogastic inconsistency – a case of scientists who believe a contradiction, both are pragmatic inconsistencies, similar to the use of approximations, idealizations or abstractions. There is therefore no threat to the classical logic of a scientific theory that is both internally incoherent and a good scientific theory.
The result of this extensive research is that inconsistency in science, if it really deserves its name, is not one thing, but many; „All inconsistencies are unequal” (p. 38) means that no general and compact theory of inconsistency is proposed in science because none is possible. Vickers admits that he has „no agenda,” for or against, to find inconsistencies (p. 156), and that he has an obligation to follow the example of his case studies with an open mind, wherever they lead. We therefore visit a varied landscape, a number of similar, but also different, contexts and situations of incoherent appearance. Overall, it is diversity, not unity, that distinguishes the theme. I said „if the inconsistency deserves its name” because one of the main points Vickers brings home (perhaps the point) is that reports of the existence of inconsistencies in science have been greatly exaggerated. Yes, there are cases where we have the right to talk about inconsistency as we usually do (accepting a finite set of sentences that result in a contradiction). But such cases are rare and if I counted correctly, there are only two in the book. One is Wolfgang Pauli`s derivation of such a contradiction from Bohr`s postulates and Paul Ehrenfest`s adiabatic principle (this is the clearest case documented here for the first time in the literature). The second is another clear case, but a little less definitive, based on a particular reading of the main theses of Newtonian cosmology. However, the alarming (but widespread) claim that inconsistencies systematically harm science simply cannot be substantiated, as the other cases can be analyzed to show that the inconsistencies are harmless or simply obvious.
An impressive feature of the monograph is its comprehensiveness. The content leaves nothing to chance. The author examines the four major scientific episodes traditionally proposed as examples of incoherent science, discusses the logic of incoherence (argues against the relevance of developing paracoherent systems), and delves into the philosophical history of science. In addition, one can find a detailed metaphilosophical reflection and justification for the method chosen to study incoherence („eliminativism theory”; see below). Chapter 1 describes the area of inconsistency in the philosophical literature, and Chapter 2 explains and defends the method to be used to understand scientific inconsistency. The next four chapters (3 to 6) are at the heart of the book and consist of four concrete case studies to which the method is applied. The cases are: Bohr atomic theory, classical electrodynamics, Newtonian cosmology and early calculus. Chapter 7 takes up four other less detailed examples: Aristotle`s theory of motion, Olbers` paradox, the „classical” theory of the electron and Kirchhoff`s theory of diffraction. Parts of the book draw on papers previously published in philosophy of science journals and explored during the author`s doctoral dissertation, but it`s worth pointing out that Vickers manages to integrate them in a very natural way. For the sake of your first responder, I must say that I am not a scientist, but I am very interested in his progress. Certainly, the standard position of science is doubt.
I`ve lost track of how many times I`ve heard scientists say how excited they are about gaps and inconsistencies in their theories because they allow them to question and develop their understanding. I heard a scientist describe his discipline as developing very nuanced doubts, and also that once the doubts are removed, only technology remains. I think it is known that many of the most amazing discoveries (in the field of science) have happened accidentally (unintentionally) while trying to solve another problem and/or even a simple laboratory error like omitting a petri dish overnight. Short. Bishop Berkley could legitimately write about Vision, but Russell should not have done so. The vision had moved from philosophy to science to a true scientific discipline, esoteric and beyond the framework of philosophy. Similarly, it is illegitimate for a philosopher to leave his discipline and comment on an extremely esoteric scientific discipline such as quantum mechanics, quarks, black holes. In these matters, the philosopher is a layman and cannot contribute. You can`t be a Hume and a Dirac at the same time. You`d have to be amazing just to be one of them. Similarly, Einstein and Hawkins should not comment on the existence or non-existence of an absolute being or the best diet. Popper does not speak of „guff”.
He`s a famous philosopher of science for good reason. His claims about falsificationism are extremely important. Logicians try to formally grasp the way we argue in everyday life. You cannot say that we do not apply any of these logics. There are reasons to believe that we use both (no conclusive reason, of course). Logic is not determined by truth. Correct logic will help us determine the truth. Truth (in my opinion, anyway) comes before logic. The second positive aspect of the monograph is its preoccupation with the philosophical method used to extract the main claims.
Vickers calls this method „theoretical eliminativism.” Here`s a quick overview of what it means and why it`s appropriate to adopt it. Not surprisingly, the term refers to the strategy of studying inconsistency in science without regard to whether the set of statements suspected of leading to contradiction really belongs to (or represents) the scientific theory that is generally presented as incoherent.